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The A merican BoMbARdMENT of 
K ampucNea, 1969-197?
B e n  K iE R N A N
O n M a rc h  18,1969, th e  U n ited  States A ir Force b e g a n  its secre t 
B-52 b o m b a rd m e n t o f  rural C a m b o d ia '.  Exactly o n e  y e a r la te r, th a t  
c o u n try 's  ruler. Prince N o ro d o m  S ihanouk, w as o ve rth ro w n  a n d  th e  
V ie tn a m  W ar, c o m b in e d  w ith  a  n e w  civ il w a r, to  te a r  th e  n a tio n  a p a rt 
fo r th e  next f iv e  years. The U n ited  States b o m b in g  o f th e  coun trys ide  
c o n tin u e d  (n o w  p u b lic ly ) a n d  in c rea sed  from  1970 to  A ugust 1973. 
w h e n  C ongress im pose d  a  halt. N early  h a lf o f th e  US b o m b in g  to n n a g e  
w as d ro p p e d  in th e  last six m onths. The to ta l w as 540,000 tons. Rural 
C a m b o d ia  w as d e s tro ye d , a n d  'D e m o c ra tic  K a m p u c h e a ' rose in its 
ashes. The e m e rg e n t C om m un is t Party o f K a m p u c h e a  (CPK) reg im e , 
le d  b y  Pol Pot, h a d  p ro fite d  g re a tly  from  th e  U.S. b o m b in g . It used th e  
w id e s p re a d  d e v a s ta tio n  a n d  m assacre  o f c iv ilians as p ro p a g a n d a  fo r 
re c ru itm e n t purposes, a n d  as a n  excuse fo r  its b ru ta l, ra d ic a l po lic ies 
a n d  its p u rg e  o f  m o d e ra te  Khm er com m unists. This is e v id e n t n o t on ly  
fro m  c o n te m p o ra ry  press a c c o u n ts , b u t a lso from  p o s t-1978 in terview s 
w ith  dozens o f p e a s a n t survivors o f  th e  b o m b in g  w h o  w e re  u n a b le  to  
tes tify  to  th e ir  expe riences  du ring  th e  Pol Pot p e r io d , a n d  from  U.S. 
G o v e rn m e n t d o c u m e n ts  new ly  dec lass ified  u n d e r th e  F reedom  o f 
In fo rm a tio n  A c t.
By O c to b e r  1972 th e  US a n d  H ano i h a d  re a c h e d  a g re e m e n t on  
te rm s fo r a  cease fire  a n d  A m e ric a n  w ith d ra w a l from  V ie tn a m . 
W ash ing ton  h a d  d ro p p e d  its d e m a n d  fo r a  N orth  V ie tnam ese  
w ith d ra w a l fro m  th e  south , a n d  H ano i h a d  d ro p p e d  its d e m a n d  fo r 
N g u ye n  V a n  Thieu's rem ova l. Both d e m a n d s  h a d  prev ious ly  b e e n  
p re c o n d itio n s  fo r  a  se ttlem en t.
Henry Kissinger, o f  course , still insisted on  H ano i secu ring , from  
Pol Pot's  CPK 'C e n te r ',  a g re e m e n t to  a  se ttle m e n t in K a m p u c h e a  as 
w e ll. But it w o u ld  h a v e  b e e n  c le a r to  him  th a t  this w o u ld  b e  im possib le, 
d e s p ite  his o w n  s ta te d  th re a t to  a c h ie v e  it b y  c o n c e n tra t in g  US a ir 
p o w e r  in K a m p u c h e a 2. The a n ta g o n ism  o f th e  CPK C e n te r ( th e  Party's 
n a tio n a l leade rsh ip  — Pol Pot, N uon C h e a . a n d  le ng  Sary) to  H ano i 
m a d e  it ve ry  unlike ly th a t  th e  CPK w o u ld  c o o rd in a te  its s tra te g y  w ith  
th a t  o f V ie tn a m . Further, a  cease fire  in K a m p u c h e a  w o u ld  h a ve  
p re v e n te d  th e  C e n te r co n so lid a tin g  w h a t it c a lle d  its “ m aste ry  o v e r th e  
re vo lu tio n a ry  group(s) in e ve ry  w a y " ,  w h ic h  w as fa r  from  c o m p le te .
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Sihanoukists. m oderates, and  pro-V ietnam ese com m unists still 
p redom ina ted  in the  rural areas. As CPK Southwest Zone docum ents 
had  exp la ined in 1971, “We w a n t to  and  must g e t a  tigh t grasp, fitter in to 
every c o rn e r '3 o f th e  diverse revo lu tiona ry  m o ve m e n t in th e  
Kam puchean countryside. A nego tia ted  p e a ce , o r even an early 
victory, w ou ld  not serve this aim.
In Vietnam,Thieu was also proving recalcitrant. It was apparently  
to  appease  him th a t Nixon ordered the  “ Christmas B om bing ' o f Hanoi 
a nd  Haiphong in D ecem ber 1972. Within a  m onth, the  Paris A g reem ent 
on Ending the  W ar and  Restoring Peace in V ietnam  had  been signed 
by all parties to  the  con flic t there. It was to  app ly  from  January 27,1973 
(and  its terms w ere little d ifferent from  those ag reed  in O ctobe r)4. The 
USA beg an  w ithdraw ing its troops from  Vietnam . However, it saw 
Kam puchea as an integral part o f the  con flic t, and  as fighting 
con tinued  the  US soon sw itched the  rest o f its air arm there.
W ashington portrayed this bom ba rdm ent as an  a tte m p t to  
fo rce  the Khmer insurgents, now  on the  threshold o f co m p le te  military 
victory, to  nego tia te  w ith Lon Nol's pro-Am erican governm ent in 
Phnom Penh. The then  CIA Chief Strategy Analyst in Saigon, Frank 
Snepp, has described the 1973 bom bing o f the Kam puchean countryside 
as “the centerpiece o f the Administration ceasefire stra tegy '5. W hatever 
its a im , the  politica l e ffe c t was tw ofo ld : to  prevent a  com p le te  
revolutionary victory a t a  tim e when the  CPK C enter's grasp over the 
revolution was still relatively w eak, and  to  strengthen th a t grasp, w h ich 
held the  country on a  course o f continu ing v io lence and  w arfa re  th a t 
lasted for the  next d e c a d e  and  more.
In the  words o f William Shawcross, “within a  few  months an  
enormous new  aerial cam p a ig n  had  destroyed the  old C a m bo d ia  
fo re ve r.'6 The cam pa ign  was certa in ly new  in scale. During all o f 1972, 
Am erican B-52s and  figh te r bom bers had d ropp ed  53,000 tons o f 
bombs on targets in K am puchea, nearly all in the  Eastern Zone o f the  
country7. In the  six months from  February to  August 15,1973 (w hen the  
US Congress im posed a  halt), the  figure was 257,000 tons, and  they fell 
on all pop u la ted  rural areas o f the coun try (shown on Shawcross's 
map)®.
W hatever the  reasons for the  1973 bom ba rdm en t, the  Nixon 
Adm inistration was absolutely com m itted  to  it. The Secretary o f the  Air 
Force, Robert Seamans, la ter said:
the President wanted to send a hundred more B-52s. This was 
appalling. You couldn 't even figure out where you were
going to put them all, you know.... I think It was a t the same
time the President was going over to Moscow.... so, anyway.
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a message was sent to the airplane - this was that timely - as 
to why we couldn't send those B-52soverthere. As I understand 
It, the response when he touched down really burned the 
wires, and he said he wanted them over there... The total 
never did quite reach one hundred, but It was a pretty large 
number10.
In his book Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon and the Destruction o f Cambodia. 
Shawcross takes up the  story: “The bom bing o f C am bod ia  was now  so 
intense th a t the  Seventh Air Force was fa c e d  w ith serious logistical 
problems. A t one stage B-52 sortie rates were as high as eighty-one per 
day. In V ietnam  the maximum had been sixty per d a y . ' Air-traffic 
congestion m ade  it impossible to  warn other a ircraft o f im pending 
strikes. The confusion was such th a t in one case a  bom bing strike took 
p la ce  sixty miles from the  ta rge t a rea, acco rd ing  to  the  Seventh Air 
Force history, w h ich “ does not record its results'11.
TAblE 1. KAIVipUchEA
US BoivibiNq ancJ CPK A rmecI F orces Gro w tH, 1969-197?
Year BoivibiNq So r tIes BoivibiNq
TONNAqE
CPK ARiviEd 
STRENqTh
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
3,600° 
8,000° 
61,000°* 
25,000°* 
c . 130,000(7)
c .227,000(7)
108,000b 
c . 121,000 
in both years
53,000
257,000
539,129
1,000
75,000
150.000
200.000 
(June) c .220,000'’
a) to  M arch 1970 b) to  M ay 1970 (B-52s only) c ) July 1970 to  Feb. 1971 d)US and Saigon sorties
The im pac t o f the bom bardm ent had been severe enough 
from  1970 to  1972. As early as April 1970, a  com bined  aerial and  tank 
a tta c k  on the  village o f Chithou in Kompong Cham  province took the 
lives o f 200 peop le  and  killed all o f the village's herd. Soon afterwards. 
In nearby Kandol Chrum, Am erican bom bs destroyed six houses and 
killed seven people . A  local peasant recalls: “ As a  result o f this, some 
peop le  ran a w ay  to  live fa r from  the village. Others jo ined  the 
revolution. *12 The pattern  o f recruitment o f bom bing victims to  the  CPK 
was to  increase over tim e, as w e  shall see. In some cases, too . the  
V ietnam ese communists were b lam ed, as the  nearest possible culprit
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fo r deaths from  bom bing by the  rem ote aircraft. The CPK C ente r 
encou raged  such popu la r reactions as well.
This was ironic, in th a t m uch o f the  bom ba rdm en t was the  work 
o f anti-com m unist V ietnamese. Shawcross wrote:
Cambodia was open house for the South Vietnamese Air 
Force... They behaved as If they were conquering a hostile 
nation, ralherthan helping a new ally; every Cambodian was 
a VC and a target. Perhaps the most chilling evidence o f the 
pleasure the pilots took in It all was contained In a cable sent 
by (the Commander o f US Forces In Vietnam, Creighton)
Abrams to the Pentagon. He reported tha t until now It had 
been virtually Impossible to Induce the Vietnamese to fly on 
Sundays. Now they were paying bribes of 1,000 plasters each 
to be allowed to go out seven days a week — over Cam bodia.
...According to a CIA report from Phnom Penh, the ARVN 
commander. Captain Le Van Vlen, frequently called In air 
strikes “to drive the people from the villages'; he and his men 
would seize the villagers' animals and force them to buy them 
back’3.
Communist troops w ere not always the  targets o f the  US 
bom bing  either. A cco rd ing  to  Shawcross aga in: "By the  end  o f the 
summer m uch o f the  country was a  free-fire zone fo r United States 
a ircraft, and  since the ir postoperational reports w ere alm ost all 
de libera te ly inaccura te , there was little fo llow -up to  see w h a t targets 
w ere ac tua lly  being a ttacked . Pilots had  fa r m ore liberty than  in 
V ie tnam  to  b om b  any ta rg e t they w a n te d . '14 The pro-US Lon Nol 
regim e in Phnom Penh was also to  b lam e in this respect. In Septem ber 
1970, US in te lligence reported: “ It was recently d iscovered th a t m any 
o f the  66 'tra in ing cam ps' on w h ich (the Lon Nol army) had  requested 
airstrikes by early Septem berw ere in fa c t m erely politica l indoctrination 
sessions held in village halls and  p a g o d a s .' The report w e n t on to  
quo te  a  're ce n t' Lon Nol regim e in te lligence assessment, to  the  e ffe c t 
th a t “ the  popu la tion  has been largely taken  in hand by the  enem y and  
cou ld  becom e in a  relatively short tim e a  trum p for h im '.  The communists 
had  w on this popularsupport not only because they “ are w e ll-behaved  
and  respectful o f the  needs and  cares o f the  p o p u la tio n , but also 
because “aeria l bom bardm ents against the  villagers have caused 
civilian loss on a  large sca le '. Unsurprisingly, the  peasant survivors o f 
the  bom bing  were turning to  the CPK for support16.
O ne casualty was Pol Pot's fam ily hom e in Kom pong Thom, 
w h ich  burnt to  the  ground a fte r a  US bom bing strike there in July 1970.
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In N ovem ber, an  F-105 nap a lm  ra id on  K om pong Svay v illage in the  
sam e p rov ince  le ft te n  villagers d e a d . A c co rd in g  to  a  loca l m an , Kun 
C hhay, how ever, th e  “ cruellest o f a l l ' w e re  th e  Cluster Bom b Units, 
w h ich  US planes b e g a n  to  sca tte r th rough  th e  nea rb y  forest and  
coun trys ide  in 1971. These bom bs w ou ld  d e to n a te  w hen  p e o p le  
unw itting ly  s te p p e d  on  th e m 16.
The bom bings also led to  la rge  po p u la tio n  m ovem ents. The 
tw o -m o n th  US g roun d  invasion o f K a m pu chea  in 1970 c re a te d  130X00 
Khmer re fugees17. In 1971, sixty p e rce n t o f refugees surveyed in the  
tow ns o f Lon Nol's Khmer Republic g a ve  th e  co n tin u e d  bom b in g  as th e  
m ain  reason fo r the ir d isp la ce m e n t18. A  co n te m p o ra ry  report on how  
b o m b in g  tu rned  villagers in to  refugees also q u o te d  a  young  Khmer 
p e a san t w h o  said he h a d  jo in e d  the  revo lu tionary arm y a  fe w  days 
a fte r  an  aeria l a tta c k  on  K om pong C ham  p rov ince  to o k  th e  lives o f 50 
p e o p le  in his v illage  o f Thmar Pich19. This you th  d e fe c te d  a  ye a r la ter, 
b u t a n o th e r such v ic tim  o f a  1971 bom b in g  ra id, w h o  by th e  a g e  o f 
tw e n ty  h a d  b e c o m e  a  CPK c o m p a n y  co m m a n d e r, to ld  journalists on 
th e  Thai b o rd e r in 1979 how  his v illage  in Pursat h a d  b e e n  b o m b e d  e igh t 
years b e fo re , killing 200 o f its 350 inhabitants a n d  p rope lling  him in to  a  
ca re e r o f v io le n ce  a n d  abso lu te  loya lty  to  th e  CPK20.
N ot all th e  bom b in g  was th e  w ork o f A m erican  or ARVN pilots. 
The T-28 fle e t o f th e  Lon Nol air fo rce , strafing a n d  d ro p p in g  n a p a lm  as 
w e ll as explosives, to o k  a  to ll in villages beh ind  com m unist lines 
th ro u g h o u t th e  w ar. In 1971, T-28s destroyed th e  rice mill a n d  houses in 
Prey C hhor v illage o f Prey V eng p rov ince , a n d  200 houses w e re  burnt 
d o w n  in nea rb y  Dong village. In K om pong Speu, Kbar C hen  v illage  
nea r O u d o n g  lost six o f its c iv ilian inhabitants in a  1971 a tta c k  a n d  tw o  
m ore  in a  secon d  b o m b a rd m e n t th e  next yea r21. Such T-28 raids 
p ro b a b ly  struck th e  g rea tes t num be r o f K a m pu chean  villages. A  
p e a san t from  Sam rong in Svay Rieng recalls w h a t he w itnessed: “ O ne 
d a y  in 1971, a  T-28 arrived on reconnaissance a n d  be fo re  leav ing  it fired 
on  p e o p le  g row ing  rice — th e y  w e re  considered  'V C '. Three planes 
th e n  re tu rned  a n d  d ro p p e d  napa lm . All th e  trees a n d  m any  houses 
w e re  destroyed , a n d  m ore th a n  te n  p e o p le  k ille d .'
H ow ever, th e  most d ra m a tic  incidents invo lved d ire c t hits by  
US B-52s. The sam e pea san t recalls:
Then In 1972 B-52s bom bed three times per day, fifteen minutes 
apart, three planes a t a time. They hit houses In Samrong and 
thirty people were killed. There were no troops In these 
villages. A tthattlm e there were some Vietnamese (communist) 
troops on the border (nearby), bu t they d id n 't bom b the 
border; they bom bed Inside It, people 's houses.
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The town of Chantrea was destroyed by US bombs... The 
people were angry with the US, and that Is why so many of 
them Joined the Khmer communists.
When troops did approach villages, the planes cam e again. 
Another peasant from SvayRieng recalls: “ In 1972, during a fierce battle  
betw een North Vietnamese and Thieu troops right in my village, six 
houses and all the trees were destroyed by napalm . There were no 
deaths though, because the people had all run a w a y .'22
Attempts by communist troops to  escape bom bing by lodging 
in villages often proved fruitless. A CIA report describes the destruction 
by bom bing o f three-quarters of the houses in a Kompong Cham  
village in 1972; the surviving inhabitants in this case expelled the North 
Vietnamese troops23. Not far aw ay in the same province, bombs fell on 
O Reang Au market for the first tim e in 1972, killing tw enty people24.
All but one of these 1972 incidents occurred in the Eastern Zone 
of Kam puchea, where US strategic (B-52) bom bardm ent was 
concentra ted  almost exclusively a t the time. But the bom bing there 
d id  not let up the next year (even though it spread equally intensively 
to  the rest o f the countryside, over all Zones but the Northwest)25.
O Reang Au was bom bed tw ice  more in 1973. The first time, the 
rice mill was hit, killing anothertw enty people, and then it was hit again 
and com plete ly destroyed along with a number o f houses nearby. Five 
more people d ied, including tw o Buddhist monks26.
Bombs also hit Boeng village in the same vicinity. It was burnt 
to  the ground, and accord ing to  peasants from the a rea , m any people 
were caught in their houses and there were “ thousands o f dea ths ', 
undoubtedly an exaggeration of the more accura te  “ m any '. Again 
in the same district, Chalong village lost over twenty dea d  when the 
village and its pagoda  were hit by T-28s during a  battle. In this case, 
all the monks escaped unhurt, but an inhabitant notes:
On the river many monasteries were destroyed by bombs.
People In our village were furious with the Americans; they did 
not know why the Americans had bombed them. Seventy 
people from Chalong Joined the fight against Lon Nol after 
the bombing27.
In a  d irect hit on Trey C hap village in Prey Veng, a  raid by  four 
F - l l ls  killed over twenty people. The village was destroyed and 
subsequently abandoned. Meanwhile, Lon Nol's T-28s kept up their 
campaigns. Two kilometers aw ay, Anlong Trea village was napalm ed 
and bom bed, killing three people and destroying four houses. “ Over 
sixty people from this village then Joined the Khmer Communist army
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out o f anger a t the  bom b ing ', locals re c a ll. '28
B-52s also scored a  d irect hit on Trapeang Krapeu village in 
Kom pong Cham . A t least tw en ty  peop le  d ied. O ther raids in the  area 
destroyed hundreds o f hectares o f rubber p lantations29.
Still In the  Eastern Zone, a  1973 bom bing strike killed five elderly 
peop le  near Krachap village in Prey Veng (CPK Region24). Asubsequent 
visit to  the  area by a  reconnaissance p lane was fo llow ed by four 
D akota helicopters bringing troops. A ccord ing  to  a  local peasant 
w om an , the  troops “ drove our ca ttle  aw ay and  stole clothes, pots and  
pans, everything. There was nothing left here*. (In 1970. Saigon troops 
had  a lready killed three o f Krachap's inhabitants and  stolen three- 
quarters o f the  ca ttle -herd .) The w om an says th a t a t this point, in 1973, 
she had  ye t to  even m ee t a  “ Khmer R ouge '30.
The CPK Secretary o f Region 24, a  m an known as Chhouk, was 
then  based further north, in a  village w h ich his w idow  claims was 
bom be d  tw ice  a  month:
(The pilots) could see motorcycles coming and going and 
they knew that an office was there. While I was there over 
thirty people were killed by bombs. In their houses. In the 
trenches, or while running to the trenches. Some entire 
households were killed In their homes'.
Presumably this involved accu ra te  ta rge ting  o f a  Khmer Rouge 
base. In a  similar incident, a Khmer Rouge cad re  recalls a  d irec t hit on 
the  district o ffice  in Kom chay Meas, in w h ich forty peop le  w ere killed. 
(He adds th a ta  num ber o f o th e rpeo p le , w ho were merely fo rag ing  or 
trad ing  a long the  roads, also d ied  in raids by B-52s, Phantoms, and  F- 
105s.)32 A  third case occurred in the same area, acco rd ing  to  a  fem ale 
ca d re  .w hen a  jung le  o ffice  was bom bed  in one o f m any attacks, each  
o f w h ich  took  several lives. “There were spies inside,' she claims, not 
only revealing the a c cu ra cy  o f the  bom bing, but also touch ing  on an 
increasing Khmer Rouge te n d e n cy  to  punish a lleged culprits w ho were 
simply m ore accessible than  those actua lly  perform ing the raids33. As 
w e  shall see. innocen t village peop le  suffered a t the  hands o f the  
Khmer Rouge as a  result o f the  bom bing raids, even if they had 
escaped  d irec t bom ba rdm en t by  US or Lon Nol aircraft.
In January and  February 1973, the  heaviest B-52 bom bing  was 
in the  northern part o f the  Eastern Zone, known as Region 21. O ne local 
cad re  from  M em ut says th a t O Klok village suffered a d irec t hit “ right 
through the  v illa g e ' in this period. Thirty peop le  w ere killed and  over a 
hundred w ounded , and  100 houses were destroyed34. In M arch 1973 
th e  bom bing  spread across the  w ho le  country, bu t rem ained heaviest
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in the East35. Associated Press reported popular complaints “about the 
bom bing by the US B-52s and je t fighters, with increasing reports of 
bombs killing civilians and destroying villages'35. Even around Phnom 
Penh itself, international relief officials in the capita l estimated tha t “ no 
fewer than 3,000 civilians' were killed in the last three weeks of March37. 
According to  a United Press International dispatch a t the end of the 
month:
Refugees swarming Into the capital from target areas report 
dozens of villages, both east and southeast of Phnom Penh, 
have been destroyed and as much as half their population 
killed or maimed In the current bombing raids by B-52s and 
F-l 11 tactical fighter-bombers38.
Within days of this report, the US bom bardm ent intensified, 
reaching a level of 3,600 tons per day on April 2-3,197339. B-52 carpet 
bombing was reported within ten miles o f Phnom Penh, as well as on 
the outskirts of Kompong Thom city. After thirty consecutive days of 
intensive American bombing, a US intelligence officer who had 
interrogated refugees from the village o f Ban Krom, sixteen miles from 
Phnom Penh, remarked: "Ban Krom has been com plete ly leveled. 
There have been many dead, many wounded and many secondary 
explosions. We judge the bombing results quite satisfactory.'40 Ban 
Krom may even have been a military target. But large-scale civilian 
casualties must have been antic ipated and accep ted . As Elizabeth 
Beckerwrote in the Far Eastern Economic Reviewon April 16, “according 
to  military reports, the targets of these devastating missions are in 
heavily-populated areas'41. One “source' was cited by Associated 
Press to  the e ffect that "the Americans are reluctant to  call in air strikes 
on villages where the opposition forces are mingling with the civilian 
inhabitants'42. But considerable evidence exists tha t even villages 
which did not house opposition forces were bom barded, resulting in 
massive loss of civilian life. One reason was later outlined to  William 
Shawcross by the chief of the political section in the US Embassy in 
Phnom Penh, William Harben. Shawcross writes tha t Harben was 
appalled by the bombing toll “and now did w hat others might have 
done ':
He cut out, to scale, the 'box' made by a B-52 strike and 
placed it on his own map. He found that virtually nowhere In 
central Cambodia could It be placed without 'boxing' a 
village. "I began to get reports of wholesale carnage', he 
says. 'One night a mass of peasants from a village near 
Saang went out on a funeral procession. They walked straight
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Into a 'box'. Hundreds were slaughtered.'43
Shawcross also tells the  story o f Donald Dawson, a  young Air 
Force c a p ta in  w ho  flew  tw enty-five B-52 missions over C a m bo d ia  in 
1973. A report th a t ’ a  C am bod ian  w edd ing  party had been  'b o x e d ' 
by B-52s... fo rce d  him, he said, to  realize th a t the C am bodians were 
hum an beings and  to  recognize th a t nonmilitary targets w ere being 
h it '.  On June 19,1973, Dawson refused to  fly ano ther mission. (He then 
jo ined  in a  lawsuit to  have US courts dec la re  the bom bing o f C am bod ia  
illegal. Topreventthepossib ilityofsuchajudgem ent.theU SG ovem m ent 
g ran ted  Dawson conscientious-objector status, a nd  the  High Court 
never heard the  case.)44
The B-52s nee ded  ground radar beacons to  gu ide  them  to  their 
targets. O ne had  been sited on to p  o f the  US embassy in Phnom Penh, 
bu t it was rem oved in April 1973 for fea r o f an acc iden t. Shawcross 
continues: "A t the  same tim e m ore and  m ore beacons w ere installed 
in C am bo d ia n  towns to  c o p e  w ith  the  expansion o f the  bom b in g . On 
August 7 one n av iga to r w ho was using the Neak Luong b e a co n  fo rgo t 
to  flip his switch. Six miles ab o ve  the  tow n the p lane 's belly ope ned  and  
the  long th irty-ton string o f bom bs 'b o x e d ' w ithou t warning on to  the  
peo p le  b e lo w .' 137 tow nspeop le  were killed and  268 w o unde d46.
Even a p a rt from  the  dea th  toll, as in earlieryears the  popu la tion  
m ovem ents fo rce d  by the  1973 bom bing were enormous. As Richard 
Blystone reported  from  Phnom Penh for Associated Press: ‘ No one can  
say w ith  co n fid e n ce  how  m any refugees there are in C am bodia ... The 
governm ent's  latest estim ate is 520,000 registered d isp laced persons 
coun try-w ide, w ith  ano the r 200XXX) unregistered. A  co n su lta n tto  a  US 
Senate S ubcom m ittee estim ated recently th a t as m any as 3 million 
peo p le  have been  fo rce d  to  leave hom e a t one tim e or ano the r during 
the  country 's  th ree-year w a r,' ou t o f a  popu la tion  o f seven million. 
Blystone then  add ed :
Among dozens o f refugees Interviewed, many said fear o f US 
bombing was one of their reasons for fleeing, but few told of 
actually being bombed. A t a pagoda outside o f Phnom 
Penh one woman said her 13 year-old son and two cousins 
died two weeks ago when a bomb hit a Jungle bunker where 
the family had taken shelter.
Asked whether they wanted the bombing stopped whatever 
the consequences for the Phnom Penh government, her 
neighbors grew enthusiastic. They said "Yes'46.
From April to  June 1973 the  bom bing was most co n ce n tra te d  in
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the  Southwest and  Northern Zones o f Kam puchea47. April also saw the  
heaviest bom bing o f the  Northeast. Then in July and  August the 
Southwest was ca rpe t-bom bed  in the most intensive B-52 cam pa ign  
yet. while ta c tica l bom bing raids increased by 21 percen t, flouting 
Nixon's agreem ent w ith Congress th a t the  intensity o f the  bom bing 
w ou ld  not be raised a fte r July l 4*. The heretofore de lica te  CPK 
fac tiona l ba lance  in the  Southwest Zone49 warrants close a tten tion  to  
the  bom bing 's im pact there. Did it tip  the ba lance  in favo r o f the  Pol 
Pot Center group ?
In m any cases, careful d igg ing o f trenches by locals was 
sufficient to  reduce deaths. AmpilTuk village in Region 15, for instance, 
was bom be d  e ight times in 1973; tw ice  by B-52s, four times by US jets, 
and  tw ice  by Lon Nol T-28s. "There were w ounded  but no one was killed 
because everyone hid in trenches," a  villager reports50. However, 
ano the r m an from  the same Region says tha t, only three days before 
the  bom bing halt on 15 August:
Three F-l 1 Is bombed right center In my village, killing eleven 
of my family members. My father was wounded but survived.
At that time there was not a single soldier In the village, or In 
the area around the village. 27 other villagers were also killed.
They had run Into a ditch to hide and then two bombs fell right 
Into It. The bombs seemed to be guided Into It like they had 
eyes51.
Even where civilian casualties were not known to  be  high, the 
CPK were now ab le  to  recruit large numbers o f peasants by highlighting 
the  d a m a g e  done  by US air strikes. An Intelligence Inform ation C able , 
d a te d  2 M ay 1973, from the  CIA's D irectorate o f Operations m ade  this 
po int a fte r investigations in Region 25 o f the Southwest Zone:
1. Khmer Insurgent (Kl) cadre have begun an Intensified 
proselyting (ste) cam paign among ethnic Cambodian 
residents In the area of Chrouy Snao. Kaoh Thom district,
Kandal province, Cambodia, In an effort to recruit young 
men and women for Kl military organizations. They are using 
damage caused by B-52 strikes as the main theme o f their 
propaganda. The cadre tell the people that the Government 
o f Lon Nol has requested the alrstrlkes and Is responsible for 
the dam age and the ’suffering o f Innocent villagers' in order 
to keep himself In power. The only way to stop ’the massive 
destruction of the country' Is to remove Lon Nol and return 
Prince Sihanouk to power. The proselyting (s/c) cadres tell the 
people that the quickest way to accomplish this Is to strengthen 
Kl forces so they will be able to defeat Lon Nol and stop the
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bombing.
2. This approach has resulted in the successful recruitment of 
a number of young men for Kl forces. Residents around 
Chrouy Snao say that the propaganda campaign has been 
effective with refugees and In areas of Kaoh Thom and Leuk 
Dek districts which have been subject to B-52 strikes52
In C ham car Ang village. Tram Kak district o f Region 13 (Takeo 
province), in the  same Zone locals say more than  eighty peop le  d ied 
when B-52s hit the  village and  its p a g o d a 53. In the  same Region, a  CPK 
cadre  recalled th a t W at Angrun village was annihilated; a  single fam ily 
survived, and  120 houses were destroyed in the  air raid. The cadre  
a d d e d , however: “The army was not hit all tha t hard, because a t tha t 
tim e w e put our lines right up against the  enem y, and  most o f the 
bom bs fell behind us. This was especially true in the case o f E-52s which 
hit either the people  or n o th ing .'54
Region 13 was one o f the strongholds o f the CPK Center, wh ich 
it ruled through its ally Mok. Mok's son-in-law, Khe Muth, was Deputy 
CPK Secretary there, and ch ie f o f Tram Kak district. The 1973 bom bing 
saw an intensification o f CPK Center control. Now Muth was prom oted 
to  beco m e  CPK Secretary o f a newly organized military fo rce , the 3rd 
Southwest Zone Brigade. His w ife Khom, daughte r o f Mok, then 
beca m e  CPK Secretary o f Tram Kak district55.
In Kom pong Chhnang (Region 31), M am Lon, w ho was then a 
CPK subdistrict cad re , says tha t both T-28s and B-52s bom bed  his village 
o f Prey Thom. He claims more than one hundred peop le  were killed 
and  w ounded. “The peop le  were very angry a t the imperialists,' he 
adds. A lthough he draws no connection, Lon also reports th a t soon 
afterwards, as in Region l3,theCPK's political line hardened significantly, 
and  a num ber o f cadres, including himself, were soon dismissed55. 
These tw o  examples reflect a general trend in the  Southwest Zone in 
1973, w hich w e will exam ine in detail.
The HEREdiTARy Enemy
Early in 1973, while continuing to  w age  w ar against Lon N o l.the  
CPK began  an intensified cam pa ign  to  drive the  Vietnamese 
communists from  the country, in com bination w ith a new  purge o f 
Sihanoukists, pro-Vietnamese communists, and  other dissident 'Third 
Force' cadre. A t pub lic meetings in the Southwest province o f Kam pot, 
Sihanouk was accused of supporting “the ha ted V ietnam ese,' and 
both  were described as enemies like Lon Nol57. A ccord ing  to  a 
subdistrict cad re  from Kompong Speu, Zone Secretary Mok rounded
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up hundreds o f Khmer dissidents “from all over the Southwest' during 
1973. They were taken to  a worksite and fo rced to  perform hard labour 
before being executed58.
The reason usually given by CPK leaders for their increased 
hostility towards the Vietnamese communists in 1973, was the a ttem pt, 
flow ing from the Paris talks w ith the US, to  ge t the CPK to  negotia te  w ith 
Lon Nol. In Kompong Speu,the same subdistrict cadre  reports, ’ Mok 
to ld  us tha t there had been three countries fighting the imperialists 
together. 'N ow  Vietnam  and Laos have negotia ted  w ith the US. 
Kam puchea will no t.' He said all cadres had to  be  instructed tha t 
Kam puchea would not neg o tia te .'59
Mok m ade this speech only tw o  weeks after the new US 
bom bing cam pa ign  began, and the subdistrict cadre 's  own village 
had just been destroyed by B-52s, w ith the loss o f three lives. He 
continues: “And Mok said tha t the US had previously d iv ided its 
bom bing betw een Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea. But now  tha t the 
other tw o  had gone to  negotia te, the US was bringing all its bombs to  
drop on Kam puchea alone, twenty-four hours a  day, because it did  
not negotiate . '50
On the  other hand, in Region 13, Zone cadres con trad ic ted  
these claims, proclaim ing that negotiations would notstopthe bom bing, 
but “would only lead to  a  prolongation o f the  w a r'. The CPK's real 
intention was to  allege Vietnamese perfidy, and  to  assert tha t, tha t, in 
the words o f these cadres, refusal to  negotia te “would dem onstrate to  
the  world tha t our Khmer Organization was independen t'.
Mok preferred not to  stress tha t the Vietnamese were 
w ithdraw ing from Kam puchea as a  result o f the Paris Agreem ent, nor 
tha t, as was well known in the Party, not only V ietnam but “some o f our 
friends like China also w anted us to  n e g o tia te '61. Thus, because it 
negotia ted  w ith the US while the CPK refused to , and  because it had 
tried to  ge t the CPK to  change its m ind, Hanoi was b lam ed by the  CPK 
for the  resultant Am erican bom bardm ent o f Kampuchea.
A more reasonable explanation, it seems to  me, w ould  limit 
b lam e to  the parties directly involved in continuing the Kam puchean 
war. For its part, the CPK can  hardly be b lam ed for the bom bing itself, 
even though it profited politically. Responsibility for the aerial 
devastation and massacre o f course lies w ith its instigators, the US 
Government. Yet the 1973 bom bing is unlikely to  have been ordered in 
the event o f a negotia ted ceasefire like tha t conc luded  in Laos in 
February 1973. The CPK leadership would have been aw are o f this from 
the outset.
The CPK Center may have expected the bom bing to  indirectly 
serve its aims by inflaming hatred o f the Vietnamese, and  as w e have
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seen this d id  o c c u r in a  num ber o f cases. But the  ha tred  o ften  h a d  to  
be  con ju red  up by stressing m ore rem ote  issues. A  w o m a n  from  the  
Southwest's Region 33, fo r exam ple , says th a t V ietnam ese com m unist 
troops w e re  c a m p e d  “ in the  forest west o f m y house ' th roughou t 1973. 
They b e h a ve d  well a n d  c re a te d  no problem s, a n d  th e  villagers ta lked  
w ith ou t strain o f solidarity, she says. But w hen they  le ft a t th e  end  o f the  
year, the  CPK subdistrict ch ie f b e g a n  to  ta lk  o f “ m utua l e n m ity ' 
b e tw e e n  the  tw o  peoples62. He was p roba b ly  fo llow ing loca l CPK 
docum ents  w h ich  referred to  V ietnam ese as the  “ hered ita ry e n e m y ' 
a n d  the  “ a c u te  e n e m y '63.
A  H anoi-tra ined Khmer com m unist ca d re , Yos Por, recalls a  
m eeting  in K am pot in la te  1973, w h ich  was addressed by Mok, a nd  tw o  
CPK Region 35 leaders.
They co llected all o f us who had studied abroad, a t Wat 
Chhouk, and started to accuse us... o f selling the territory to 
Vietnam. They were Instigating the breaking o f solidarity with 
Vietnam, talking In terms o f history. Mok said that Kampuchean 
territory was wherever there are sugar palms. This included 
Kampuchea Krom (‘Lower Cam bodia', the Mekong Deltaj. 
which Vietnam had taken (In the eighteenth century). The 
Kampucheans would fight to get It back, Mok said64.
Within months, a  CPK district ch ie f in Kom pong C hhnang (Region 31). 
to ld  his subordinates: “ K am puchea  Krom must b e  libera ted ; it was 
o n ce  Khmer territory a n d  w e  have  lost it all. If w e  d o  no t figh t the  
V ie tnam ese, w e  will lose th e  rest o f our country... V ie tnam  is th e  most 
a c u te  enem y, th e  hered itary enem y. A fte r v ic to ry  w e  aim  to  g o  and  
libera te  K am puchea  K rom .'65
Underlying the  anti-V ietnam ese position, then , was th e  CPK's 
revival o f na tiona l chauvinism . D e fea t o f th e  US a n d  Lon Nol was only 
a  step tow ards the  na tiona l a nd  rac ia l g randeur o f w h ich  young 
m em bers o f the  trad itiona l elite had  long d re a m e d 66. In rural warlords 
like M ok (and  Pauk in the  Northern Zone), the  fo rm er m em bers o f the  
upp e r classes w h o  m ade  up  the  CPK C ente r now  had  th e  m eans to  pu t 
the ir dream s in to  e ffec t.
THe CLass ENEiviy
On 20 M ay 1973, as the  US bom b a rd m e n t a p p ro a c h e d  its 
he ight, th e  CPK C en te r launched  a  'coo pe ra tiv iza tion ' p rogram , 
w h ich  initially invo lved organizing peasants in to groups o fte n , tw en ty , 
or th irty families. This had  a lready  occu rred  in m any CPK-held areas, 
bu t now  land  was to  be  co llectiv ized as w ell a nd  the  p ro d u ce  o f the
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peasants' labour was to  be confiscated by the authorities. In some 
cases, regulations concern ing the destruction o f religion and fam ily 
life, and enforced com m unal eating in mess halls, w ere also 
im plem ented. This was term ed the "D em ocratic Revolution'67.
The increased dem ands o f the CPK arm ed forces, resulting 
from the bom bing, partly m otivated this new cam paign. The CIA 
Intelligence Information Cable o f 2 May 1973 reported the testimony of 
a  CPK p la toon com m ander, w ho said tha t “ B-52 strikes in Leuk Dek 
district killed m any soldiers and guerrillas of the K-24 and K-25 battalions. 
He said villagers left their homes and took only w hat they cou ld  carry. 
In spite o f the disruption, Khmer Insurgent (Kl) finance-econom y cadre  
were ordered to  co llect as much food  and  m oney as possible to  supply 
Kl and  North Vietnamese army forces. This has caused resentment 
am ong the villagers, many o f whom  were already short o f fo o d . '68
A CPK docum ent da ted  February 1974 gave one o f its reasons 
for the cam pa ign , as follows: "Our country is a t w ar and  no m ercy has 
been shown us. Therefore, m any o f our young people  have gone o ff 
to  the  battle fie ld , and  only the old and w om en are le ft. '69 A CPK 
m em ber later explained tha t by ensuring a minimum subsistence for all 
villagers through collection o f rationing o f supplies, the communists 
cou ld  “ release forces ' for the army and its logistical needs, notab ly the 
ab le -bod ied  w ho in theory were no longer needed to  support their 
families70.
However, both these CPK sources also gave a  second reason, 
an ideologica l one. The CPK docum ent explained: “We must construct 
a  c le a n , honest society.'  W hat this m eant was to  be outlined the  next 
year in the CPK's internal magazine, Tung Padevat (Revolutionary 
Flags). Its author expressed a  studied am biva lence abou t the situation 
in com munist-held areas up to  1973:
There was progress on the one hand, and the same old 
society on the other... The state confiscated land from the 
traitors... and took control of It... This was a good point... 
(Secondly, however) those In possession of the land continued 
to keep their private ownership. Furthermore, previously 
landless peasants, and previously landless workers now 
received land from the state. Therefore, land remained In 
private ownership In general71.
The result was tha t “ the traders and the enem y... were the  masters... We 
cou ld  not becom e the masters if w e continued on this road... Our state 
was their satellite.' The exam ple given illustrates the extreme sensitivity 
o f the CPK: “ Kratie township showed the same signs as in the  old 
society. Honda m otorcycles were speeding up and dow n the  streets
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like before , while our ragged guerrillas w a lked in the dus t.'72
So in 1973 the  CPK C enter d e c id e d  th a t it must ensure th a t "the 
state contro lled  everyth ing '. Kratie's popula tion was eva cu a te d  to  
the  countryside. There was to  be "no  more trad ing , m ortgag ing , labor 
exchanging or buying on c re d it'. A state m onopoly was decree d  over 
rice, salt, fuel, c lo th  and petrol. W ithout petrol, private owners of 
vehicles (and  Honda m otorcycles) 'd is a p p e a re d '; the  CPK state took 
over the ir equ ipm ent. Private ownership o f land and  o f the  means o f 
p roduction  was also abolished73.
The po litica l m otivation for all this is underlined by a  form er 
Eastern Zone CPK m em ber, w ho  attributes the changes to  he ightened 
revolutionary zeal resulting from  the advances the  Party had  m ade 
thus far: 'The reason was th a t the peop le  supported the Khmer Reds, 
so the Khmer Reds dec ided  to  move on to  higher-stage cooperatives. *74 
G iven more than  an inch by  their association w ith Sihanouk, their a id 
from  the V ietnam ese communists, and  the popu la r reaction to  the  US 
bom bing , the  CPK C enter now  d ec ided  to  take  a mile. Popular 
approval o f relatively m oderate policies becam e an excuse for extremist 
ones.
The accoun ts o f tw o  peasants from  different parts o f the 
coun try illustrate this. They also con trad ic t the c la im  th a t the 
cooperatives provided a  superior means o f ensuring the subsistence o f 
villagers. N em ,46 ,from  Region 31 in the  Southwest Zone, says th a t the 
m utual a id  team s in troduced in 1972 were popular in his village; each  
person earned an a d e q u a te  ration o f p a d d y  per year. But in la te 1973, 
cooperatives were organized, and  Nem b eca m e  a  cook in the 
co m m u n a l e a tin g  hall. Rations w e re  insu ffic ien t, p o p u la r 
d isenchantm ent rose, and  within a year villagers were being execu ted 
for stealing fo o d  from  the  com m on store75.
Sang, 43, a  peasant from Region 22 in the  Eastern Zone, recalls 
th a t 'th e  living conditions o f the people  were really prosperous' a fte r 
the  in troduction o f m utual a id  team s in 1972. 'I t  was easy, no 
prob lem s.' But,
Then In 1973 the cooperatives were formed, and difficulties 
began. The rice was stored in collective warehouses, and 
food ran short. Eventually people ate only rice gruel, with salt, 
water and banana stalks. We had to get permission to raise 
our own poultry, under pain of imprisonment.
Im portantly, though . Sang no ted th a t the cooperatives w ere not 
established "all a t o n c e ' in mid-1973. Rather, the loca l Party leaders 
'se le c te d  certa in  g o o d  places, w ith goo d  cadres ' to  start w ith, “ for
American Bombardment 19
fea r o f popular reac tion '. The process was not com ple te  even tw o  
years later, when com m unal eating was finally instituted (m uch later 
than in the  Southwest). Sang described the local CPK district and 
subdistrict chiefs up to  tha t tim e, in favorab le  terms. Three villagers 
were imprisoned in 1974, but he reported no executions or starvation. It 
is hard to  believe tha t the cooperatives cou ld  have been established 
a t all w ithout, firstly, some degree o f public con fidence  in the local CPK 
leaders, and secondly, the  fa c t tha t "peop le  in our village were furious 
w ith the Am ericans'. For it was in Sang's village, ca lled  Chalong, tha t 
more than  tw enty peop le  were killed in a T-28 bom bardm ent in 1973, 
and  seventy others im m ediate ly jo ined the communist arm y76.
THe No rtHern Z one : THe emerqence of D emocratic 
K a m p u c h e a
Outside the Eastern Zone, the CPK response to  the  bom bing 
was far more dram atic. Even where no deaths resulted, there were 
frequently subsequent arrests o f villagers suspected o f being “spies' 
w ho had ca lled  in the air strikes. The most proxim ate potentia l culprit 
aga in took the  blame. Paranoia b eg an to  p lague the Khmer communist 
m ovem ent as never before. In the  Northern Zone, Kun Chhay. w ho 
lived in Sankor village o f Region 32, recalls tha t Ke Pauk's CPK troops 
now  accused the villagers o f being "CIA agen ts ' w ho had brought in 
the  US planes. The people o f Sankor, now afra id o f both US bom bing 
and Pauk's justice, offered no resistance when Lon Nol forces penetrated 
the area and crea ted  a third alternative: "(They) pointed guns a t us, 
and  to ld  us to  leave for Kompong Thom C ity .'77
A ccord ing  to  Chhay. this new Lon Nol army patrolling was the 
culm ination o f "countless' raids on Kompong Svay district by B-52s, T- 
28s, F-105s, F-l 1 Is, and  Skyraiders, mostly from mid-1972 to  M arch 1973. 
B-52s, for instance, struck Stung Kam bot village a t 9 o 'c lo c k  one 
morning in February 1973. They killed 50 villagers and seriously w ounded 
30 others. No Khmer Rouge were am ong the casualties. A w eek later 
another raid struck a t nearby Prey Tup village. Then in M arch 1973, B- 
52s and F-111 s bom barded  an ox-cart caravan a t O Saray in the  same 
district, killing ten  peasants78.
The e ffec t o f all this was predictable. Chhay says: “ It o ften 
happened (that) people  were m ade angry by the bom bing and  w ent 
to  jo in the revolution.' And if they d id not, they ran the risk o f being 
b la m e d . as spies, fo r the dam age  and loss o f life their communities had 
suffered. Pauk's troops killed peasants on such accusations. (And 
a fte r the w ar ended in 1975, Chhay says, further revenge was exacted  
by CPK cadres from city people and others they held responsible for 
the  bom bing.)79
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Further south, a  peasant youth nam ed  Thoun C heng reca lled  
the  im p a c t o f the  bom b ing  on his v illage o f Banteay Chey. For three 
months, B-52s b o m b e d  the  village three to  six times per day. Several o f 
C heng 's  fam ily  m em bers w ere injured in the  raids, and  over 1,000 
p eo p le  w e re  killed — nearly a  third o f Banteay Chey's popu la tion . 
A fte r th e  bom b ing  e nd ed , C heng says, “the re  w ere  fe w  peo p le  left to  
be  seen around the  village, a nd  it was qu ie t“80.
A nother young peasant, Tong Teng, jo ined  th e  com m unist 
a rm y in 1970 in Santuk district o f the  Northern Zone. He to ld  Frangols 
P onchaud a nd  Bruce Palling in a  1982 interview th a t “ bom b ing  was a 
norm al th ing from  1970 o n '.  He add ed :
If you mean big bombs, I saw them being dropped a t Andaung 
Prlng (village)... The bombs cam e tumbling down In a big 
clump... right onto Andaung Prlng, and that time villagers 
were killed In amazing numbers... The bombs fell In the village, 
setting fire to people's houses and killing them... sometimes 
they d id n 't even have the time to get down out o f their 
houses.
The bombing was massive and devastating, and they Just 
kept bombing more and more massively, so massively you 
cou ldn 't believe It, so that it engulfed the forests, engulfed the 
forests with bombs, with devastation81.
Chhit Do had  com e  into the  com m unist m ovem ent from  a  
similar backg ro und , a nd  a t the  tim e o f the 1973 bom b ing  he was an 
a g itp ro p  leade r in the  Angkor W at a rea  o f northern Kam puchea. He 
was the re  a t the  tim e o f Norodom  Sihanouk's c landestine visit in M arch, 
1973. (He recalls: “Sihanouk had  been gone  only a  d a y  w hen the  B-52s 
ca m e  a fte r him and  bom bed... The bom bing  com p le te ly  to re  up  th a t 
road , as if it h ad  never ex is ted .') In la te  1973 Chhit Do b e c a m e  a  CPK 
subdistrict ch ie f, a nd  a fte r v ic tory in April 1975, co m m a n d e r o f a  3,000- 
strong regional work brigade. In 1979, he fled  the  country, a n d  three 
years la ter he to o  looked b a ck  on the  period o f the  US bom bing: “ It was 
d ifficu lt in every possible way... due  bo th  to  everybody 's  fe a r o f the 
bom b ing  a n d  to  th e  fa c t  th a t eve rybody was e n g a g e d  in m aking w a r 
outside o f the ir villages. All the young peop le  had  gone  o ff to  war... 
There w a sn 't anyth ing to  eat. They still had  to  turn over rice to  the 
Khmer Rouge.'  Bruce Palling then asked Chhit Do a  series o f questions:
Q. Were people being killed by the bombs ?
A. Oh yes, there were some... Some Khmer Rouge soldiers and
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some ordinary people were killed by the bombs, by the 
planes.
Q. Did the Khmer Rouge make use of the bombing to do 
propaganda against the US ?
A. Oh yes, they did make use o f It. They did use It to stigmatize 
the US. They said that all this bombing was an attem pt to 
make us an American satellite, a manifestation o f simple 
American barbarism, because, after all, as they pointed out, 
we had never done anything to these Americans, the people 
had never done anything a ta ll to America. TheKhmersdldn't 
even have any alrplanesand here the Americans had brought 
theirs to bom b us, causing great pain to us. with their war. Their 
country was way over there somewhere and here they had 
com e to Interfere with us... (The) propaganda was tha t this 
guy Lon Nol had already sold the country to the Americans, 
because Lon Nol wanted power, wanted to be President...
Q: Could you be more specific about the content o f their 
propaganda?
A: They shouted and they cursed and called for opposition to 
the Americans. Moreover, they took the people to see the 
effects of the bombing as a kind of additional political 
education. Every time after there had been bom bing, they 
would take the people to see the craters, to see how big and 
deep the craters were, to see how the earth had been 
gouged out and scorched. And the political education 
cadres would pick up pieces o f shrapnel and these slabs of 
metal tha t had been part of the bomb casings to show them 
to the people and point out that the bombs were the size of 
a man, the size o f 100 kilogram rice sacks. They would say that 
the purpose o f the bombing was to com pletely destroy the 
country, not simply Just to win the war while leaving the 
people alive to rebuild It after the war was over, but to 
annihilate the population, and that It was only because we 
were taking cover, moving around to avoid the bombing, 
that some of us were surviving. So they used the bombing, the 
bomb craters and the bom b shrapnel to educate the people 
politically, to make the people hate and be enraged a t the 
Americans. They said that In Japan, the Americans had 
dropped an atom  bomb during World War II. They said that 
we must point our anger a t the Americans and never forget, 
that even If every last one o f us were killed, we still must not 
give up. As long as anybody was le ft alive, we must Just keep
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on struggling and struggling.
Q: That's what the cadres said, but how did the people 
themselves feel?
A: The ordinary people were terrified by the bombing and the 
shelling, never having experienced war, and sometimes they 
literally shit In their pants when the big bombs and shells came.
Artillery bombardments usually Involved 200-400 shells per 
attack, and some people became shell-shocked. Just like 
their brains were completely disoriented. Even though the 
shelling had stopped, they couldn't hold down a meal. Their 
minds just froze up and would wander around mute and not 
talk for three or four days. Terrified and half-crazy, the people 
were ready to believe what they were told. What (the Khmer 
Rouge) said was credible because there were just so many 
huge bombs dropped. That was what made it so easy for the 
Khmer Rouge to win the people over... It was because o f their 
dissatisfaction with the bombing that they kept on cooperating 
with the Khmer Rouge, Joining up with the Khmer Rouge, 
sending their children off to go with them, to Join the Khmer 
Rouge....
Q: So the American bombing was a kind of help to the Khmer 
Rouge ?
A: Yes, that's right. Itwasa kind of help. It helped to get them 
to come over to the Khmer Rouge and help, because the 
people saw, well, sometimes the bombs fell and hit little 
children, and their fathers would be all for the Khmer Rouge.. ®2
An ea rlie raccoun t o f the e ffec tso f the bom bing in the  Northern 
Zone com es from  a CPK infantryman w ho subsequently d e fe c te d  to  
the Lon Nol governm ent. His first ba ttle  was the early 1973 siege o f 
Kom pong Thom, w h ich he says progressed successfully for several 
months. Towards the end o f tha t period the tow n's residents began  to  
flee through the ba ttle  lines into the insurgent zones. "But one night... 
w e  heard a terrifying noise w hich shook the ground; it was as if the  earth 
trem bled, rose up and  opened beneath  ourfeet. Enormous explosions 
lit up the  sky like huge bolts o f lightning; it was the  Am erican B-52s.'
In the morning we received the order to retreat a t the double 
from Kompong Thom. The countryside was upturned .cratered 
with huge holes; the trees were smashed to splinters and all 
our trenches had been disemboweled or burled. Hundreds of 
our comrades had been killed. We were scarcely better off
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- we could no longer hear anything, and we could hardly walk 
straight. With the other survivors we headed by truck towards 
the forests of the Northwest.
Just as they did in the Southwest, CPK internecine antagonisms 
in the Northern Zone becam e most serious in 1973. The same soldier 
reports tha t by the year's end:
There had been conflicts between the civil and military 
leaders (Koy Thuon and Ke Pauk, respectively) of the 
Organization. The civil leaders claimed that the military 
offensive had been launched too early, and that Its failure 
had compromised the establishm ent of the new 
administration. The military claimed that the civilians' mistakes 
had broken the patriotic spirit of the population, who after the 
B-52 raids and the retreat of our forces had fled to the other 
side.
Many villagers, peasants and officers had been executed 
and the disorganized Khmer Rouge militias had been fighting 
one another63.
Obviously, the military debac le  sparked recriminations. As Pol Pot 
himself had his headquarters in the Northern Zone, these proved 
crucial. Koy Thuon was later accused of “ giving no thought to  the 
ba ttle fie ld '*4. A previously influential m oderate CPK leader, Thuon 
was pushed aside by Ke Pauk, whose fellow warlord Mok, another Pol 
Pot ally, was a t tha t very tim e fuming his guns on m oderates in the 
Southwest Zone.
A fte rthe  bom bing halt in August 1973, the soldier returned with 
his unit to  Kompong Thom to  find tha t the population m ovem ent into 
the countryside had reversed. 50,000 peasants had in fa c t fled into 
Kompong Thom town. “The countryside was deserted, the villages 
em p ty ,' the soldier recalls. This was not just because of the US 
bom bardm ent or the aggressive Lon Nol army patrolling. It was also 
because Ke Pauk (and probably Pol Pot's w ife Khieu Ponnary, w ho in 
July 1973 was reported to  have becom e CPK Secretary o f Kompong 
Thom province) had fully im plem ented the Dem ocratic Revolution in 
the region.
In the Kompong Thom region the Organization (the CPK, was) 
led by very severe men... Their discipline was terrible; there 
were many executions... Buddha statues were destroyed and 
pagodas secularized; youths forced to work very hard, 
especially when the villages had been reorganized and
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rebuilt; the Organization had not allowed the construction of 
Individual houses; there were camps for women, children, 
young women and young men; meals were eaten 
communally and rations consisted only of rice soup without 
meat... children were forbidden to respect their parents, 
monks to pray, husbands to live with their wives...85
In Kompong Kdei district o f Siemreap province, during 1972, 
some bom bing o f the area had already begun; and although the 
digging o f trenches kept the number o f local deaths low, the 
appearance  o f US planes inspired great fear. Accord ing to  a Kompong 
Kdei wom an: "A t tha t tim e it was not so hard working under the Khmer 
Rouge; w e  were afra id only o f dying under the bom bs.' Here as 
elsewhere, intensification o f the US aerial cam paign was accom pan ied  
by a significant hardening of communist policy. B-52 bom bing o f the 
area began in M arch 1973, and in tha t month, accord ing  to  the 
w o m an , Kompong Kdei was forcibly evacua ted  by CPK forces and  the 
market closed down; the town's one thousand families, now  alleged 
to  be 'uppe r class' (vanna kphuos). were sent into the forest to  clear 
the land forfarm ing. Work was collective, in twelve-fam ily groups, and 
the harvests confiscated to  feed  the increased requirements o f the 
army. "They only left us w ith w ha t we m anaged to  hide a w a y ,' the 
w om an recalls85.
In September 1973, thirteen battalions o f Pauk's forces seized 
half o f the city o f Kompong Cham , and penetra ted to  within a hundred 
meters o f the Lon Nol province governor's residence. When they 
w ithdrew, they took 15X00 townspeople into the countryside with 
them. (Four Khmer communist troops captured by the Lon Nol forces 
c la im ed th a t Vietnamese communist forces had offered fire support 
for the siege of the tow n, but, they said, the CPK com m ander had 
"refused this support a t a critical stage o f the figh ting ' because he 
preferred to  dep loy his troops "to  escort civilian cap tives ' rather than 
to  pursue the battle  for the town.)87
In February 1974, Pauk's forces were com m itted  to  a  drive 
towards Phnom Penh, and thousands more peasants in the Northern 
Zone took the opportunity to  flee into the Lon Nol-held province cap ita l 
of Kompong Thom. Their accounts, particularly o f low food  rations, 
confirm  other descriptions. "We were forced to  work very hard, and 
go t no th ing ,' a former village ch ie f to ld  journalist Donald Kirk soon 
afterwards. The dea th  penalty was com m only app lied , particularly for 
evasion o f the  CPK draft. The refugee continued:
In April of 1973 they stopped talking about Sihanouk... They 
said that he was "not the only m an,' that he was "no good
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now," and that 'w e do not need him any more'... If you still 
use his name and support Sihanouk, then you will be sent 
away, and you will never return... (We were told to) ‘ support 
Khleu Samphan and no others.'88
The 'state ' o f Democratic Kampuchea had emerged fully grown from 
the Democratic Revolution in the Northern Zone. When tha t state was 
officially proclaim ed by the Pol Pot regime in January 1976, Norodom 
Sihanouk was quickly replaced as Head of State by Khieu Samphan.
THe NoRThEAST Z one
Because of its remoteness and sparse, mainly non-Khmer tribal 
populations, little is known about political developments in the Northeast. 
A defector reported in 1973 that for strategic reasons, the Zone was 
‘ underthe direct administration' of Pol Pot's CPK Center89. The latter's 
cooperativization program may have been inimical to  the various 
m ontagnard tribal populations there, and in com bination with the US 
bom bing and the local influence of Vietnamese-trained communist 
cadres, may have been responsible for a communist mutiny there in 
197390. Vietnamese sources claim that the Zone military com m ander 
and his Staff Assistant (both of whom had spent the 1954-1970 period 
in V ietnam ), and the Deputy CPK Secretary o f Rattanakiri province, led 
a popular rebellion in Voeunsai district in 19739’ . They were unsuccessful, 
and the three withdrew to  the Vietnamese border; in 1974 they were 
jo ined by another Hanoi-trained cadre,from  Stung Treng92. At any rate 
the Northeast in general receded in strategic significance for the 
Center as CPK forces closed in on Phnom Penh.
But because of its importance as a staging point for Vietnamese 
communist troops on the Ho Chi Minh Trail, the Northeast Zone was an 
area o f Kampuchea closely monitored by US forces. Moreover, after 
30 June 1970, congressional limitations on the bombing of Kampuchea 
restricted it to  the interdiction of men and supplies en route to  Vietnam. 
This restriction ‘ was ignored from the start' ( ‘ I w ant this purpose 
interpreted very broadly,' Nixon said), and ‘ thefalsification o f bombing 
reports was now accep ted  as norm al'93. But the procedure was to  
nominate the northeast, to  be called Freedom Deal, as ‘ a virtual free 
fire zone '94. Later, the area was extended to  the whole o f eastern 
Kampuchea, as far as the Mekong River. As Shawcross reports:
It was gradually pushed southward and westward Into more 
heavily populated areas, as the fighting spread. Bombing 
outside Freedom Deal was reported as being Inside, and 
bombing In populated areas Inside as being In wild, 
uninhabited places. The mlsreportlng meant that there was
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very little folbw-up or 'bom b damage assessment*, after 
mlssbns’ ®.
Nevertheless, the  sparse popula tion and jungle cover in the 
Northeast Zone did favour reporting by US agents crossing the  border 
from V ie tnam . The majority o f Bomb D am age Assessments declassified 
by the  US G overnm ent are reports on the  Northeast Zone, and  nearly 
half com e from  one district, Andaung Pich, o f Rattanakiri Province, 
a d jacen t to  V ietnam ’ 6.
The majorUStargets in this Zone were undoubted ly Vietnamese 
com munist troops (North Vietnamese Army or Viet Cong). This was 
apparen t, fo r instance, in the US Army reports on the destruction o f the 
province cap ita l o f Rattanakiri:
....on 27 April 1973, Ba Kev City, Cambodia, was In ruins. All
(Illegible) completely destroyed (Illegible) raid. The city had 
been abandoned and all civilians were believed to have 
moved to safer locations. The suspected NVA battalbn-slze 
base cam p within the city had been completely devastated 
and no evidence of NVA presence remained In the city....
Installatbns/facllitles destroyed included two bunkers of an 
NVA bunker complex and an undetermined number of 
dwellings within the city67.
But as the bom bing reached it speak in m id -1973, the  civilian 
toll m ounted. Villages were often bom bed because they were near 
a lleged military cam ps or convoys o f Vietnamese or Khmer insurgent 
(Kl) troops. But civilian casualties frequently outnum bered military 
ones. In tw o  such incidents in early August 1973, the reported casualties 
were as follows:
1. Seven houses destroyed, nine civilians kilted and 20 
wounded. Extent o f communist military casualties unknown.
2. Eighteen houses destroyed, three civilians kilted and one 
wounded. One Khmer Insurgent killed and six wounded. One 
North Vietnam Army (NVA) soldier kilted9®.
Note th a t such statistics, accord ing  to  Shawcross. are likely to  
underestimate civilian casualties.
On 3 August 1973, US aircraft bom bed the village o f Plei Loh in 
Rattanakiri province. A ccord ing  to  an Am erican a gen t w ho reported 
on the dam ag e  nine days later, 'th e  village was to ta lly destroyed, w ith 
28 civilians and  five VC guerrillas k illed '” . He reported th a t a bo u t 30
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peop le  had been wounded.
The next day, B-52s a ttacked  Plei Lorn village in the same area. 
Accord ing to  the Army's Bomb Dam age Assessment da ted  16 August: 
"A t Plei Lorn village there were 23 houses. Two bombs fell on tw o  houses 
killing tw enty people, including ch ild ren .'100 On 10 August, Plei Lom was 
bom bed again, “ resulting in 30 montagnards and an unknown num ber 
o f guerrillas k illed .',01
On the same day B-52s also struck nearby Plei Blah village: "As 
a  result 50 m ontagnards were killed, 30 houses in Plei Blah village. 
C am bodia , and  three houses in Plei Nhai village. South V ietnam , were 
destroyed. An unknown number of communist troops and cadre  were 
killed.' It was later noted tha t Plei Nhai village was in fa c t loca ted  in 
C am bodia , not Vietnam. The US army report continued: “ Becausethe 
strike took p lace so close to  South V ietnam , the Communists intend to  
use this incident for p ropaganda purposes.'’02 However, not enough 
is known abou t the CPK internecine struggles in the Northeast Zone to  
conc lude  tha t they bore any relationship to  political effects o f the US 
bom bardm ent o f the Zone. The pattern is m uch clearer in w hat 
becam e the heartland o f the Pol Pot regime — the Southwest Zone.
AfTERMATh: The So uthw est Z one
The Southwest Zone saw the greatest convulsions in the 
revolutionary ranks in 1973. This was the year tha t the Mok-Thuch Rin 
tendency , closely allied with the Party Center, established its supremacy 
over Chou Chet, Prasith and their more m oderate colleagues, and 
com ple te ly eclipsed the Hanoi-trained Khmer communists throughout 
the  Southwest Zone.
TAblE 2.
COMMUNIST PARTy of KAMPUCHEA 
SourhwEST Z one P a rty  C o m m ittee, 1972-1974’03
P o st 1972 1974
Chairman Chou Chet (demoted 1973) ?
Secretary Mok Mok
Deputy- Prasith (killed mid-1974) Kang C hap (from
Secretary 26 August 1 9 7 4 -? )
M em ber Sangha Hoeun (killed 1973) ?
M em ber Thuch Rln Thuch Rin
M em ber Phouk Chhay (demoted 1973) ?
N.B. Chou Chet, Kang Chap, and Phouk Chhay were a ll arrested and executed In Dem ocratic 
Kampushea In 1977-78. Mok and Thuch Rln remained Im portant leaden o f the exiled Party of 
Dem ocratic Kampuchea In 1988.
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The first high-ranking victim  was apparently  Sangha Hoeun, a 
com m unist veteran and  a  m em ber o f the Southwest Zone CPK 
com m ittee . A form er monk from  Kom pongSpeu, w ho had  jo ined  the 
communists in 1970, recalls:
In 1971-72 the revolution was good; the people were not 
worried atall. Sangha Hoeun was friendly with theVietnamese 
and never had any trouble with them. And the people liked 
Sangha Hoeun a lot because he sponsored theater 
performances with traditional national music. Also, there 
were plenty of Lon Nol soldiers who came to the liberated 
zones from Phnom Penh and the province capitals, to Join the 
revolution. Sangha Hoeun and Chou Chet re-educated and 
taught these people. I saw this; they did not kill them. ButMok 
did kill such people, and he became angry with what the 
other two were doing. There was a power struggle.
In 1973 the killings began. A t first there were transfers of 
subdlstrict and Region cadre. Then Chou Chetand his followers 
fought with Mok's followers, a t a combined Zone and Region 
meeting In our subdistrict, which I helped organize. The fight 
broke out over politics and theory. In the middle o f the 
meeting. Chou Chet then left for the west to discuss the 
question o f the execution of the Lon Nol soldiers. Phouk Chhay 
went with him. I was told they were transferred to Koh Kong.
Two weeks later, Sangha Hoeun wasarrested by Mok's troops.
At first they took him under guard to our village for a day and 
a night, and then to the Center or Zone (headquarters). Five 
trucks came to take his fol towers away toKompongChhnang.
In 1976. D em ocra tic  Kam puchea security personnel reported tha t 
Sangha Hoeun had been “sm ashed ',04.
From across the Vietnamese border, the  US analyst Kenneth 
Quinn reported tha t in 1973, Chou Chet “ had his authority and  influence 
... reduced  because o f his pro-NVA and pro-Sihanouk stands and , in 
fa c t, was even am bushed and slightly w ounded by the  (CPK forces) 
o nce  in la te Novem ber while travelling w ith some NVA soldiers on 
Route 16.',0S
After his arrival in Kom pong C hhnang, Chou C het con tinued  to  
stress solidarity w ith the Vietnamese a t politica l m eetings’06. A m em ber 
o f the  CPK youth m ovem ent there also claims tha t, because Chet was 
an in te llectua l, he was in constant conflic t w ith a  "forest* revolutionary 
like Mok. Further, C het and  others like Phouk Chhay (and Koy Thuon in
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the North) apprec ia ted  Prince Sihanouk's appea l, even if to  them  he 
was only a figurehead. In fac t, “the people believed in Sihanouk more 
than in the revolution'; problems arose when the Party began to  
criticize the Prince openly, and Mok's response was to  impose his 
authority by force;
Mok was cruel ever since 1971-72. Unlike Chou Chet and 
Phouk Chhay, he was fierce, a killer. The killings began In 1973, 
as the bombs were falling. Also, some prisoners of war were 
executed, and others put In re-education centers. 1973 was 
the year the US began bombing (the area) with B-52s, so they 
had to fight back hard. The killings were In accordance with 
regulations. This was called 'strengthening the Democratic 
Revolution'. No one dared resist the changes.
I know for sure,from friends who worked directly with Mok, that 
he was the one who ordered the killings. They took place In 
the forest....
Mok had the power but he did not have much understanding 
of politics. Phouk Chhay was educating him (but) there was 
conflict between the 'forest resistance” , people like Mok, 
and the 'Internal (urban) resistance", people like Phouk Chhay 
who had recently arrived, since 1970. The conflict arose 
because the Internal group wanted to train Ihe forest group 
to Increase their capacity, and to assert their authority over 
them107.
Here again they seem to  have lost out. The CPK Secretary o f Region 31, 
Chan, was replaced in 1973 by Sarun, who was still loyal to  the  Party 
Centere ight years later. A cam paign criticizing Sihanouk was launched. 
and  accord ing  to  the local subdistrict cadre  Mam Lon, there was a 
“ change in the political line'. Lon was expelled from the Party in 
O ctober, and soon afterwards one o f his com rades in the youth 
m ovem ent was executed along with three other local officials10*.
Kenneth Quinn reports tha t local elections were no longer held 
in the areas newly seized from the Lon Nol government; from 1973, he 
says, village chiefs and subdistrict officials were merely appo in ted  by 
CPK district committees. Buddhist festivals were reduced to  tw o  per 
year.and Muslim ones “ to ta lly fo rb idden .' InKam potin July 1973, each 
Buddhist wat was ordered to  supply ten monks to  serve as infantrymen 
in the army's dep le ted  ranks. Soon afterwards, in both Takeo and 
Kampot provinces, all but four monks in each wat were drafted , which 
Quinn notes "dec im a ted  the monk popu la tion ' there. At the same 
tim e, towns in the area were evacuated, and in rural areas a “ large-
30 Vietnam Generation
scale re location process' was im plem ented — 20,000 people were 
m oved out o f their villages In tw o  districts o f Kampot alone. Quinn 
continues: “ In parts of Takeo and Kampot, the Khmer Communists 
brought in a  large num berof new cadresto  implementthis program me, 
having lost fa ith in m any older cadre whom  they considered to  be 
either pro-North Vietnamese or not tough enough to  carry it o u t. '109
July 1973 also saw the defection to  the Lon Nol regime o f the 
Khmer communist military com m ander o f Region 38 (Kompong Speu), 
w ho had undergone training in Hanoi in 1971. (Two Khmer veterans 
w ho had spent the years 1954-70 in Vietnam, also de fec ted  in 1973, the 
first to  do  so since 1971.)’ 10
Popular unrest was also mounting’ ’ ’ . Quinn reports tha t fighting 
broke out betw een rival communist units in the Southwest in November 
1973. He cites three incidents in Kampot o f popular and military 
reaction to  attem pts by CPK cadre to  forcibly relocate the population 
and confiscate rice harvests. In one cast, dissident communist forces 
"rallied abou t 500 villagers to  com e to  their a id, and, arm ed with 
scythes, m achetes and hatchets, drove the KK (Khmer Krahom , or 
officia l CPK forces) off, killing nine and wounding tw en ty '. A fourth 
clash in the same area in Decem ber saw a  hundred people killed and 
w ounded, and  by January 1974 "a  large pro-Sihanouk fo rce  was 
reported maneuvering to  gain control o f all o f Route 16 from Tani to  Tuk 
Meas. as well as part o f Route 205 each of Tani*. In March 1974, 742 
communist dissidents surrendered to  the Lon Nol regime in the Southwest. 
They cla im ed to  represent a to ta l force o f 10,000 w ho were ready to  
follow them  if Lon Nol granted them operational autonom y to  continue 
their fight against their CPK rivals. (They were refused.)
In Region 13, the imposition o f the Dem ocratic Revolution 
sometimes provoked assassinations of cadres by enraged, recalcitrant 
villagers. As one local CPK soldier tells it:
A t first the Khmer Reds were popular, from 1970 to 1974. Their 
line was good, with no oppression. The people were prepared 
to follow them Into the socialist revolution. In July 1973 I 
enlisted because 1 believed what they said about liberating 
Kampuchea from oppressorsand Imperialists. But persecution 
began In 1973-74, when everything was collectivized. 
Communal eating was Introduced In May 1973, In groups of 
12 families. (Soon) people were eating banana leaves, sugar 
palm roots, coconuts, and finally weeds. Then there was 
nothing left a t all. In the end the people rebelled, killing 
cadres In all villages. Here (Prey Pley village) one cadre was 
taken off and disappeared. So the Khmer Reds had to give 
In, and In 1974 private eating was once again allowed.
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But this district. Tram Kak, run by Mok's daughter Khom, was to  be 
officially lauded by the Party as the first inTakeo to  in troduce com m unal 
eating, which o f course resumed after victory in 1975. M eanwhile, in 
nearby Kong Pisei district (Region 33), tw o  Region-level cad re  were 
assassinated by their own couriers in 1974, after they had a tte m p ted  to  
send out orders to  im plem ent the new measures. Although it is possible 
tha t Quinn underestimated the solid base o f support tha t the CPK had 
deve loped  am ong a minority o f poor peasants in the Southwest, the 
thrust o f his conclusion is undeniable: "In early 1973 when the KK 
entered the new harsh phase of their cam paign In which all rules were 
strictly enforced and unpopular programs carried out, w ith stiff penalties 
for non-com pliance, almost all popular feeling turned against them .'
Finally, and perhaps most im portant of all in the political sense, 
cam e the destruction o f Prasith, the Southwest Zone Deputy Party 
Secretary w ho actually outranked Mok on the CPK Central Comm ittee. 
He ran coastal Koh Kong province. An ethnic Chinese w om an w ho 
was living there a t the tim e recounts w hat happened to  Prasith and his 
lieutenant Prachha. whom  she calls the ’ free Khmer Rouge':
In late 1973, the Vietnamese....were told to go back to their
country and we saw no more of them.
In 1974, hard limes began. Zone and Regional armed forces 
from Kompong Sella arrived In Koh Kong;.... Prachha was 
arrested and taken away. They said he was going to study, 
but actually they killed him. Everybody In Koh Kong was 
afraid, because their leader had been taken away. Prasith
disappeared about the same time.... It got harder and
harder. The Khmer Rouge began killing people; people who 
did anything wrong were taken away and shot. In 1974 they 
recruited every youth 16 years old or more Into the Army....
Some who d idn 't go were killed.
A ccord ing to  Lon Nol intelligence, which confirms this accoun t of 
Prasith's execution. CPK Center m ember Vom Vet assumed control o f 
In m id -1974.
There was one exception. About 200 o f Prasith's followers 
escaped arrest and fled into the Cardam om  mountains a long the Thai 
border, where they initially set up five small bases, each  o f p la toon 
strength. Led by Sae Phuthang, these people  held out for the  next six 
years. Abandoned by the Vietnamese communists, they constituted 
no real threat to  the CPK regime, but were occasionally a ided  by 
ethnic Khmers and local Thai officials across the border. With the
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overthrow  o f D em ocra tic  Kam puchea in 1979. a  hundred o f them  
em erged  to  pa rtic ipa te  in the  form ation o f the People's Republic o f 
Kam puchea. Sae Phuthang b eca m e  Deputy Secretary o f the  ruling 
People's Revolutionary Party o f Kam puchea, and  tw o  of his lieutenants 
b e ca m e  Party Secretaries o f Koh Kong and  Kam pot provinces.
CONCLUSION
There is no d o u b t th a t B-52 bom bardm ent was a t times a 
devasta ting w e apon  against massed forces, and  th a t CPK and  NVA 
units suffered enormous casualties from it. Table 3 summarizes 
declassified assessments by the  US Army o f m ajor dam ag e  done to  
com m unist units in eastern K am puchea during air strikes in 1973. These 
assessments are striking for the high killed-to-wounded ratios c la im ed, 
recalling Shawcross's po int a bo u t the  fabrica tion  o f reports. But they 
are not inconsistent w ith the  c la im  of General John Vogt, C om m ander 
o f the  US Seventh Air Force. th a t 16,000 Khmer insurgents w ere killed by 
US bom bing in 1973"2. If this is the  case, the 1973 bom bing postponed 
the  revolutionary v ictory for a  crucia l tw o  years.
On the  o ther hand, it is apparen t th a t on m any occasions CPK 
and  o ther “ Khmer insurgent' forces d id  avo id  casualties by  d igg ing  air- 
d e fence  shelters. One report to  the US Army in July 1973 stated: “ In 
headquarters areas, m any o f the  shelters are o f solid construction and  
ab le  to  w ithstand bombs. In frontline areas, shelters are o ften built 
under b a m b o o  groves and  are relatively safe, barring a  d irec t h it. ' But 
for civilians the  e ffe c t was m uch more devastating. The same report 
continued:
Civilian reaction to US air strikes: Most houses In the com bat 
zone have been totally destroyed, either by US bombs or by 
the communists themselves. Civilian reaction to the 
devastation Is mixed; but an objective appraisal seems to be 
that the US. Cambodian government and the communists 
are equally responsible (sic). It Is a fact, however, that the 
civilian population fears US air attacks far more than they do 
Communist rocket attacks or scorched-earth tactics '13.
A cco rd ing  to  the  historical division o f the  US Departm ent o f 
Defense, m ore than  11,000 Khmers were killed by US b o m b in g "4. This 
seems a  serious underestimation, perhaps because o f the  difficu lty 
and  fab rica tion  involved in the monitoring o f casualties in areas distant 
from  the  V ietnam ese border. The ev idence  o f survivors from m any 
parts o f Kam puchea suggests a t least tens o f thousands, p robab ly  in 
the  range o f 50,000 to  150£00 deaths, resulted from  the US bom bing 
cam paigns in K am puchea from 1969 to  1973.
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TAblE J.
DEcUssifiEd US Boivib D amaqe A ssessm ents:
EffECTlvE Ain Sm lkES A qaIn st CommunIs t  T roops In Eastern  KuMpudtEA, 1977
D a t e  o f PIacx Zone Killed Wounded CIvIIIan CasuaLtIcs,STRlkc Damaqc
3/23/73 Kampot SW 30 dead or seriously w ounded
4/26/73 Memut E 100 VC 
and Kl
150
4/29/73 Memut E 70 VC 200
4/30/73 Kompong E 40 VC 35 Kl "V ery m any houses o f
4/73
Cham 60 Kl C am bodian p e o p le ' were 
destroyed In ttie  B-52 strike. 
Including 'thew estern  h a lf' 
o f M l S aturn v illa g e  
'com p le te ly  destroyed .'
Takeo SW 1000
5/73 Neak E 2000
Luong
6/13/73 Phnom SW c.1000
Penh
7/22/73 Komchay E 37 NVA
Meas 30 Kl
8/5/73 Rattanakirl NE 105 Kl 100 'N o civilian damages...reported.*
8/6/73 Romeas E 100 30
8/7/73
Hek
Kompong E 425 500 'Dead cM lons were buried In the
Trach 'seriously' viclnlty...500 meters northeast of Phum So* Dong."
8/8/73 Rattanakirl NE 5 VC
10/8/73 Romeas E 113 Kl 30 Kl
Hek
8/12/73 Svay Rieng E 25 NVA over 30 ’ 2000 C am bodian nationals
Vietnamese crossed the  C a m b o d ia /
and Khmen Vietnam  border fo r re fug e ' 
from  the bom bing.
8/11/73 Takeo SW C.300 Kl killed or w ounded
8/12/73 Tbaung E 50 70 Those killed and w ounded
Khmum 'seriously' In c lu d e d  'C a m b o d ia n  
c iv ilia ns ' (exact num ber
8/15/73 Andaung NE 40 NVA
Plch
TotaLs : C.5/100 C. 1,300 Unknown
Sources: US CIA and  D epartm ent o f th e  Army, docum ents declassified 
19 February a nd  7 April 1987.
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W hat was ach ieved? The Khmer Republic, the  in tended 
b en e fa c to r o f the  bom bing, m ay perhaps be given the last w ord on 
the  m atter. On 28 July 1973. the J-2 intelligence section o f the Khmer 
National Arm ed Forces reported on the 'Enem y Outlook a fte r 15 
August 1973*.ltnoted: 'The Am erican bom bing halt can  only favorab ly 
influence the  m orale and  the behavior o f the  enem y.'  But it w en t on 
to  make a devastating criticism o f the bom bing 's e ffe c t on the arm ed 
forces o f Lon Nol's Khmer Republic:
On the other hand. It will have a sad effect on the state of 
mind and the attitude of our own forces who have been 
accustomed for the last six months to benefit from the unlimited 
support o f the air force and will have great difficulty In doing 
without It. In effect, too often air Intervention had been called 
In when ground action would have been sufficient. They 
depended on this support so much that certain units, already 
little Inclined to go beyond the limits of their quarters, no 
longer adventured on the terrain If alrsup port was not assured.
This tendency a t all levels, and particularly a t the basic units 
level, of considering the bombing 'as an end In Itself.'  has 
seriously compromised the fighting capability of many units.
Because of this, our troops were not able to take advantage 
o f the air Intervention which, logically, should have enabled 
them to pull themselves together and retake the Initiative 
starting a t the end of January',s.
For his part. Henry Kissinger has staunchly de fended  the  US role, 
c la im ing in 1979 tha t 'W e  destabilized C am bod ia  the  w ay Britain 
destabilized Poland in 1939."" 6 He states in his memoirs: 'I tw a sH a n o i 
— an im a ted  by an insatiable drive to  dom inate  Indochina — tha t 
organized the  Khmer Rouge long before any Am erican bom bs fell on 
C am bod ian  so il.'” 7
Five years earlier, however, Kissinger had had a  more perceptive 
view. In an April 1974 cab le  to  the US Embassy In Phnom Penh, he had 
written:
In the areas such as southeast and southwest Cambodia 
where there has been a Khmer Rouge organization since the 
1940s, we could assume that a t least the political organization 
If not the military Is dominated by Khmer Rouge who not only 
had little training abroad but probably resent and com pete 
with the better-trained men from North Vietnam. It Is not 
happenstance that there Is significant conflict between the 
VC/NVA and the Khmer communists In these areasof southern 
Cambodia so close to South Vietnam.
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’ Nevertheless/ Kissinger added ,
a Titolst Cambodia which Is Independent and doctrinaire 
would be dangerous to Its neighbors as a sanctuary for 
communist rebels. The Khmer communists, such as Saloth Sar 
(Pol Pot), Koy Thuon and Khleu Samphan are probably 
xenophobic both when It comes to Vietnamese and the local 
Chinese Inhabitants. One objective of a Cambodian 
communist regime would be to expel or severely control 
these groups.
By 1974,then, Kissinger was aware — largely through the reports 
o f Kenneth Quinn — of the existence o f the chauvinist Pol Pot tendency. 
But he was as yet unsure tha t the CPK Center p layed the dom inant role 
in the Khmer Rouge movement. He noted tha t ’ our lack o f precise 
know ledge of the insurgency makes it difficult to  describe the decision­
making process and identify the decision-makers':
Convincing arguments can be made that the Insurgency Is 
less a centrally controlled communist rebellion and more an 
Insurgency with several regional bases. It Is difficult to say 
whether one can go so far as to describe It as warlordlsm, but 
It does square with Cambodian tradition, and the nature of 
this particular war. A factlonallzed Insurgency with a veneer 
of central control does explain certain past anomalies In 
Insurgent operations and apparent conflicts. The insurgents 
no doubt have a central committee and If the Communist 
Party Is as advanced as It should be after 25 years of existence 
there probably Is a presidium made up of little known leftists 
such as Saloth Sar. Nuon Chea, Koy Thuon, Non Suon, and 
more prominent French-trained Individuals such as Khleu 
Samphan, leng Sary, Son Sen, Hou Yuon and to a lesser extent 
TtvOland Phouk Chhay. These men In our view wield the real 
power”  *.
How true this last sentence was to  prove. Saloth Sar, Nuon Chea, Khieu 
Samphan, leng Sary and Son Sen still make up the  Khmer Rouge 
leadership in 1988 (having purged and executed the other five second- 
level figures on Kissinger's lists, betw een 1975 and  1978)” ’ .
The tragedy of Kisslnger'slndeclsionastowhetherthe insurgency 
was regional. and factlonallzed with only ’ a  veneer o f centra l con tro l, ' 
or w hether ’ the real power* was w ie lded by the central presidium 
headed  by Pol Pot, is tha t the  form er was largely true In 1972; the latter 
was largely true In 1974; and Klsslngerand Nixon were largely responsible
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for w h a t had happened  in between.
The year 1973 was a watershed in Kam puchean history. The 
massive bom bardm ent o f th a t year had several m ajor effects. First, it 
de c im a te d  and  even destroyed a  num ber o f CPK regular units. (The 
casualties were particularly heavy am ong Southwest Zone units during 
the  siege o f Phnom Penh in July 1973’20, and  this m ay have he lped tip  
the  ba lance  o f pow er there in the  CPK Center's favour.) Second, the 
bom bing caused enormous losses o f Khmer civilian life and  property. 
Third, these drove a large num ber o f new  recruits into the  revolutionary 
ranks, recruits w ho were often m otiva ted  as m uch by a  desire for 
revenge as by positive politica l or social goals. Such peop le  w ere an 
asset to  the  Pol Pot group.
In one case, CPK cadrestold young survivors o f US bom bardm ent 
th a t "the  killing b irds' had com e “from Phnom Penh' (not Thailand or 
G uam ), and  th a t Phnom Penh must be m ade to  pay for its assault on 
rural K am puchea121. On the day  the bom bing ended, 15 August 1973, 
CPK p ropa ganda  leaf lets found in bom b craters in Rattanakiri a ttacked  
the  “ Phnom Penh warriors' w ho were, they c la im ed, soon to  be 
d e fe a te d 122.
The popular reaction to  the bom bing was cleverly m anipu la ted 
by the  CPK Center. This was p roba b ly fa ta l fo r relatively m oderate  CPK 
leaders like Prasith, w ho was overwhelm ed by fanatics and  killed just as 
Chou C het and  Phouk Chhay also lost out to  Mok and  Thuch Rin in the 
crucia l struggle for contro l o f the Southwest Zone a t this time. It Is c lear 
to o , th a t Koy Thuon's position in the North, in relation to  the  Zone military 
com m ander Ke Pauk, was severely underm ined by the Im pact o f the 
bom bing there. Had all these people  been ab le  to  hold their ground, 
the  history o f Kam puchea in the rem aindero f the  1970s m ight well have 
been different.
The Pol Pot leadership o f the  Khmer Rouge can  in no w a y  be 
exonerated from responsibility fo r com m itting genoc ide  against their 
ow n people. But neither can  Nixon or Kissinger escape judgem ent for 
their role in the  slaughter th a t was a  prelude to  the genocide . Worse, 
but for th a t extreme exam ple o f US militarism, the Pol Pot group m ay 
have been den ied  their opportunity. It remains to  be  hoped th a t they 
will not ge t ano ther one.
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